Madam Speaker, I would like today to give not a novel,

certainly not a unique overview of what I think some of the things we

need to do to help win the battle of Iraq constitute. Again many of

these things are being done, but I just want to try to put it forward

as a comprehensive exposition of what we need to do to win. I think

that there are three key areas involved in this struggle along all

fronts upon which we have to continue to press: democracy, the economy

and, of course, the military.

In terms of diplomacy, I believe everyone understands that the key

now is the holding of free elections on time in Iraq. The U.N. has

agreed with this, and while their support is welcome, it remains

tenuous. We should encourage all member states of the U.N. to rise to

the challenge of democracy in Iraq and provide the necessary personnel

to defend the monitors and help these elections go forward. For as we

know, what is going to happen is that the terrorist counterattack on

democracy in Iraq will escalate. They will do everything they can to

derail these elections. Yet that violence and terror in and of itself

should not be enough to deter us and certainly should not deter the

Iraqi people.

And as for the naysayers who claim that absent a perfect election in

Iraq, it cannot be deemed a representative success, I would just like

to ask those detractors to ask themselves why we demand more from the

Iraqi people in a civil war than we demanded from ourselves in our own

American civil war; because all one needs to do is to look at the map

of 1864 to see that the States in rebellion did not participate in

Abraham Lincoln's reelection. Yet I highly doubt that anyone today can

say that it was not a representative election nor an election that was

worthy of the American people.

In terms of the economy, one of the things that we face in Iraq

clearly is the passive-aggressive resistance of the Iraqi people. After

years of oppression, after years of being terrorized and after seeing

so many international promises fall away, it is very difficult for them

to stand up and fight on their own without the assurance that the

United States and our coalition partners will be behind them. But it is

also important to remember that while we provide them the possibility

of a transformational change from tyranny to democracy, we must always

remember that in any representative political system there is also a

transactional element; for it is one thing to profess ideals to an

oppressed people who have been newly liberated, it is another thing to

provide concrete, tangible benefits to the populace to show them the

investment in their future.

I think that one of the things that we have to do in Iraq is build on

the town council model. We have to take a bottom-up approach, a

grassroots approach to reconstruction in Iraq. We have to have and

invest full decision-making authority into town councils, tribal

leaders, religious leaders, and other community organizations that have

been set up, let them determine what infrastructure projects in their

area must be worked upon, let them figure out the processes by which

they will come to these determinations and let them have control of the

money to implement these decisions. These are very formative, basic

steps along the road to a transition to democracy and to building

lasting institutions upon which the Iraqi people can build.

I also think that in conjunction with the grassroots approach to the

local control of the decision-making and the implementation of those

decisions is that we should adopt an Iraqi oil fund similar to the one

that we have in the State of Alaska. The Iraqi oil fund would take

portions of the proceeds from the sale of Iraq's oil, place it in a

fund and distribute it per capita to the people of Iraq.

The benefits of such a model, which we have seen in Alaska, will be

also readily apparent in Iraq. It will provide a direct economic

benefit to the people of Iraq, showing them the stake in their future.

It will provide an immediate jump-start to the Iraqi economy and get

them up to the average per capita spending that is expected to start

any semblance of a stable economy. I think we should also use it as

spur to register adults to vote in the upcoming elections, for if one

is not a registered voter, one cannot receive the benefits of the Iraq

oil fund.

I think that this will also prove to help uproot terrorists because

no terrorist will be eligible to receive the per capita annual

appropriation from the Iraqi oil fund. This will also, in turn, I

believe help the Iraqi people further their efforts to defend their oil

infrastructure and further their efforts to uproot the terrorists who

would disturb it because the money would be being taken out of their

mouths. It would be taken out of their children's mouths. In short, it

would be an intolerable situation for them to allow to continue.

I think that we would also see a quelling of some of the

sectionalism. I think we would begin to see that oil, rather than a

divisive force amongst the regions of Iraq, could then be used as a

means of unifying them and perhaps give them a greater semblance of an

Iraqi national identity.

As we have seen throughout the history of Iraq, oil has often been

used as the dictator's tool for fueling his oppression of his people.

If this oil fund is written into the Iraqi constitution, not only will

it hasten the adoption of an Iraqi constitution, it will safeguard

against one individual being able to rise up and usurp control of the

oil funds because truly the oil will belong to the people, and I

believe the people will jealously guard this right under their new

constitution.

I think it will also do one other thing: It will make the people less

susceptible to any attempts by the terrorists or any future dictator to

prey upon their impoverishment by offering them blandishments or other

remunerative items in return for their loyalty to a new regime or to a

new movement.

I think from the United States' point of view it will do something

very important: It will belie the perception amongst much of the Middle

Eastern population and amongst some of Western Europe and amongst some

of our own population that the United States is there to take the oil,

for we are not. The oil belongs to the Iraqi people.

What more tangible, palpable way could that be proven than by having

this put into their constitution?

I also believe it has another tangential benefit: that the United

States, by being willing to help the Iraqi people establish an oil

fund, the oil fund will stand in stark contrast to the Oil for Food

scandal that was operated by the U.N. which was perpetrated on the

people of Iraq and in which many corrupt politicians in both the U.N.

and in Iraq benefited at the expense of the poor Iraqi people.

I think that finally under the economy, we have to look at debt

forgiveness. It is one thing for world powers or other members of the

world community to claim that a free and stable Iraq is not their

problem to the point where they will send troops to help win this

battle, but it is another thing to say that they will not forgive the

debts they incurred dealing with Saddam Hussein to help further the

goal of Iraqi prosperity on the road to democracy. If we think about

it, every country that has sold weapons to Saddam Hussein and has

outstanding debt on the basis of those weapons is asking the newly

liberated Iraqi people to pay the debt for the guns and the weapons

that Saddam Hussein used to kill and torture them into submission. I

think that is an inhuman request of any government, and I think that

unless the world powers that sold these weapons are prepared to forgive

these debts, I think it is morally justified by the Iraqi people to

repudiate any debts incurred by Saddam Hussein's regime for the

acquisition of weapons, be they conventional, be they weapons of mass

destruction, or be they dual-use technologies or any instrument of

oppression that he applied to his people.

Militarily I think that we have to hone our military and our

intelligence to a fine precision. I think we have to prioritize the

three threats that we face in Iraq at the present time. They are, one,

I think the foreign terrorists clearly, followed by the Baathists and

the Sunnis, many of them who are operating with the foreign terrorists,

and of course the radical Shiia Iraqis who have come back from the

shelter of Iran. I think that these are prioritized by order of

importance for the long term.

The foreign terrorists are there to drive the Americans out. I think

that over time, the Baathist remnants that currently have a marriage of

convenience with them, should the Americans be thrown out, the

Baathists and the Sunnis will then immediately turn upon them, which

will lead to a blood bath in the short run and could further incite a

civil war. We have to start with the foreign terrorists and the

Baathists in a simultaneous effort to eradicate them from the terror

that they are perpetrating on their country.

Third, we must then face the threat from the radical Shiia movement

personified by the radical cleric Moqta al-Sadr. And it is important to

remember that at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, in Saddam Hussein's

mind he was fighting a defensive war, for after the Khameni regime

attained power through the Iran revolution, they immediately began

destabilizing the secular Baath regime and targeting members of the

Baath government for assassination and terrorizing them to undermine

the Sunni-Baathist secular party and replace it with the Shiia

revolutionary government modeled upon Iran.

These people were then forced from the country by Saddam Hussein,

where they were sheltered in Iran for decades. They have been

returning, and as they return, let there be no doubt that the incidents

we see in Najaf and in other areas of the south have been perpetrated

in many ways by these people who have come back to continue the quest

to establish an Iranian mullah model upon the people in Iraq.

The tactics that we see from all three, predominantly the terrorists

and the Sunnis, of course, are very similar to those that were

perpetrated by the Colombian cartel drug lord, Pablo Escobar, for, in

short, he utilized a private army to terrorize and destabilize the

Government of Colombia, and he used largesse to the population to in

many cases buy their loyalty or at least their silence and submission.

As for the largesse that is handed out, if we can refer back to the

economic model that I laid out, I think that will be very helpful in

preventing that type of temptation by the Iraqi people.

In terms of his private army and in terms of the efforts to

destabilize the Iraqi government, they are very similar to what the

Colombian drug lord did. He is targeting the police. He is targeting

the army. He is targeting the government, especially law enforcement

within the government, including the judiciary and ministers. He is

targeting infrastructure. He is doing that to continue to disrupt the

supply of oil and continue the impoverishment and the suffering of the

Iraqi people. And, of course, they are targeting civilians to generally

terrorize the country.

Finally, just as Escobar did, these are designed and geared as much

towards inflicting casualties and wanton destruction as they are to

influencing the media coverage of their action, and thus having a

multiplying effect of their mass murder by bringing it to millions of

homes across the globe.

What we have to do to stop this is to understand these tactics and to

ourselves adapt to the targeting of these institutions and these

individuals and guard against them. We must also make sure that we rely

upon the fledgling Iraqi army security forces and citizenry in order to

root out their infrastructure and destabilize them in the very same

manner that they are trying to destabilize the people of Iraq. We have

to address their organization, root and branch. We can do that. I

believe we have started to, and I believe we will continue to.

We must also make sure that our coalition partners expediently and

decisively strike back in troubled areas, whether or not the Iraqi

national guard and security services are prepared, for in the final

analysis, we cannot leave a Fallujah to be a hotbed of terrorism. We

cannot leave Najaf and the holy shrines in Shiia Islam in the hands of

a radical renegade cleric.

It is my belief that the people of Iraq have had enough of this and

that what they really need to see is a decisive stand to reestablish

order in that country. And if we are not prepared to do that, every day

we wait, there is an erosion of confidence in the Iraqi government and

in the coalition, and another day's worth of despair that brings Iraqi

people closer to a newly implemented dictatorship of terror.

We must also make sure that we, the Nation that brought the world

mass communication, fully engage in the battle of ideas and, yes, to

use what is often thought a pejorative word, the battle of propaganda.

We must get our message out to the Iraqi people. We must get our

message out to the Arab world, and we must get our message out to the

entire world. It is very critical that the people of Iraq see, through

their newly bought satellite dishes, which were outlawed by Saddam

Hussein, what freedom is doing and what the suffering and sacrifice of

their own fellow Iraqis, notably the police and the military, who have

been targeted for death, are doing to win that freedom.

I think we must also press as quickly as we can here in the domestic

front to come up with new technologies to combat the tactics,

especially the roadside bombs, that are attacking our troops in the

field.

I think, finally, we must also make sure that we continue to empower

American troops on the ground with the freedom to make combat

decisions.

We must allow them to make these combat decisions free of political

constraints in order to ensure that they come home to their loved ones

with their mission accomplished.

Madam Speaker, in the end, through military, economic and diplomatic

means, we must press forward, because our enemy is not only the

terrorists, our enemy is time; for while this is a battle of resolve,

it is also a battle of reason, and the longer Iraq appears to be

irrational and unreasonable and incapable of governance, the time ticks

on our keeping our resolve.

At the present time, let us remember that our task is far greater

than that of the terrorists. The terrorists have the task of

destabilizing a country. We and our coalition partners have the task of

stabilizing it. The latter tasks is far harder. It will call upon our

every ounce of commitment; it will call upon as well our every ounce of

intelligence to come up with a rational plan to win this battle and to

secure Iraq in the community of nations.

To anyone, I would welcome their comments. Anyone who has any

suggestions, I would welcome them, because, in the end, this is an

exposition of what I hope to be a rough outline of a coherent plan. Not

having possession of the absolute truth more than anyone else, I would

like to know what other people think, because at this time in our

nation's history we are not Republicans, we are not Democrats, we are

not ideologues, we are all Americans. So let us see what we can come up

with, and, as we always have, we will win.